Bandit learning is characterized by the tension between long-term exploration and short-term exploitation. However, as has recently been noted, in settings in which the choices of the learning algorithm correspond to important decisions about individual people (such as criminal recidivism prediction, lending, and sequential drug trials), exploration corresponds to explicitly sacrificing the well-being of one individual for the potential future benefit of others. This raises a fairness concern. In such settings, one might like to run a "greedy" algorithm, which always makes the (myopically) optimal decision for the individuals at hand -but doing this can result in a catastrophic failure to learn. In this paper, we consider the linear contextual bandit problem and revisit the performance of the greedy algorithm. We give a smoothed analysis, showing that even when contexts may be chosen by an adversary, small perturbations of the adversary's choices suffice for the algorithm to achieve "no regret", perhaps (depending on the specifics of the setting) with a constant amount of initial training data. This suggests that "generically" (i.e. in slightly perturbed environments), exploration and exploitation need not be in conflict in the linear setting.
Introduction
Learning algorithms often need to operate in partial feedback settings (also known as bandit settings), in which the decisions of the algorithm determine the data that it observes. Many real-world application domains of machine learning have this flavor. Predictive policing algorithms (Rudin, 2013) deploy police officers and receive feedback about crimes committed and observed in areas the algorithm chose to deploy officers. Lending algorithms (Byrnes, 2016) observe whether individuals who were granted loans pay them back, but do not get to observe counterfactuals: would an individual not granted a loan have repaid such a loan? Algorithms which inform bail and parole decisions (Barry-Jester et al., 2015) observe whether individuals who are released go on to recidivate, but do not get to observe whether individuals who remain incarcerated would have committed crimes had they been released. Algorithms assigning drugs to patients in clinical trials do not get to observe the effects of the drugs that were not assigned to particular patients.
Learning in partial feedback settings faces the well-understood tension between exploration and exploitation. In order to perform well, the algorithms need at some point to exploit the information they have gathered and make the best decisions they can. But they also need to explore: to make decisions which do not seem optimal according to the algorithm's current point-predictions, in order to gather more information about portions of the decision space about which the algorithm has high uncertainty.
However, in practice, decision systems often do not explicitly explore, for a number of reasons. Exploration is important for maximizing long-run performance, but decision makers might be myopic -more interested in their short-term reward. In other situations, the decisions made at each round affect the lives of individuals, and explicit exploration might be objectionable on its face: it can be repugnant to harm an individual today (explicitly sacrificing present utility) for a potential benefit to hypothetical future individuals (long-term learning rates) (Bastani et al., 2017 , Bird et al., 2016 . For example, in a medical trial, it may be repugnant to knowingly assign a patient a drug that is thought to be sub-optimal (or even dangerous) given the current state of knowledge, in order to increase statistical certainty. In a parole scenario, we may not want to release a criminal that we estimate is at high risk for committing violent crime. In such situations, exploration may be viewed as unfair to individuals, or to society at large.
On the other hand, a lack of exploration can lead to a catastrophic failure to learn, which is highly undesirable -and which can also lead to unfairness. A lack of exploration (and a corresponding failure to correctly learn about crime statistics) has been blamed as a source of "unfairness" in predictive policing algorithms (Ensign et al., 2017) . In this paper, we seek to quantify how costly we should expect a lack of exploration to be when the instances are not entirely worst-case. In other words: is myopia a friction that we should generically expect to quickly be overcome, or is it really a long-term obstacle to learning?
Our Results
We study the linear contextual bandits problem, which informally, represents the following learning scenario which takes place over a sequence of rounds t (formal definitions appear in Section 2). At each round t, the learner must make a decision amongst k choices, which are represented by contexts x t i ∈ R d . If the learner chooses action i t at round t, he observes a reward r t i t -but does not observe the rewards corresponding to choices not taken. The rewards are stochastic, and their expectations are governed by unknown linear functions of the contexts. For an unknown set of parameters β i ∈ R d , E[r
. We consider two variants of the problem: in one (the single parameter setting), all of the rewards are governed by the same linear function: β 1 = . . . = β k = β. In the other (the multiple parameter setting), the parameter vectors β i for each choice can be distinct. Normally, these two settings are equivalent to one another (up to a factor of k in the problem dimension) -but as we show, in our case, they have distinct properties 1 .
We study the greedy algorithm, which trains a least-squares estimateβ t i on the current set of observations, and at each round, picks the arm with the highest point-predicted reward: i t = arg max iβ t i · x t i . In the single parameter setting, greedy maintains just one regression estimateβ t .
It is well known that the greedy algorithm does not obtain any non-trivial worst-case regret bound: there are simple lower bound instances for the greedy algorithm even in the simple stochastic bandit setting, which is a special case of the contextual bandit problem (in which the contexts are the same at every round). We give a smoothed analysis which shows that these lower bound instances do not arise "generically." Specifically, we consider a model in which the contexts x t i are chosen at each round by an adaptive adversary, but are then perturbed by independent Gaussian perturbations in each coordinate, with standard deviation σ. We show that in the presence of these perturbations, the greedy algorithm recovers diminishing regret bounds that depend only polynomially on 1/σ. We show that in this smoothed analysis setting, there is a qualitative distinction between the single parameter and multiple parameter settings:
1. In the single parameter setting (Section 3), the greedy algorithm with no initialization at all (having no initial observations) with high probability obtains regret bounded byÕ
over T rounds.
2. In the multiple parameter setting (Section 4), the greedy algorithm requires a "warm start" -that is, to start with a small number of observations for each action -to obtain non-trivial regret bounds, even when facing a perturbed adversary. We show that if the warm start provides for each arm a constant number of examples (depending polynomially on fixed parameters of the instance, like 1/σ, d, k, and 1/(min i ||β i ||)), that may themselves be chosen by an adversary and perturbed, then with high probability greedy obtains regretÕ √ T kd σ 2 . Moreover, this warm start is necessary: we give lower bounds showing that if the greedy algorithm is not initialized with a number of examples n that grows polynomially with both 1/σ and with 1/ min i ||β i ||, then there are simple fixed instances (that do not require an adaptive adversary) that force the algorithm to have regret growing linearly with T , with constant probability. (See Section 5 for a formal statement of the lower bounds.)
Our results extend beyond the particular perturbed adversary that we study: we give more general conditions on the distribution over contexts at each round that imply our regret bounds.
Related Work
The most closely related piece of work (from which we take direct inspiration) is Bastani et al. (2017) , who, in a stochastic setting, give conditions on the sampling distribution over contexts that causes the greedy algorithm to have diminishing regret in a closely related but incomparable version of the two-armed linear contextual bandits problem 2 . The conditions on the context distribution given in that work are restrictive, however. They imply, for example, that every linear policy (and in particular the optimal policy) will choose each action with constant probability bounded away from zero. When translated to our perturbed adversarial setting, the distributional conditions of Bastani et al. (2017) do not imply regret bounds that are sub-exponential in either the perturbation magnitude σ or the dimension d of the problem.
There is a large literature focused on designing no-regret algorithms for contextual bandit problems (e.g. Agarwal et al. (2014) , Li et al. (2010 Li et al. ( , 2011 , with a special focus on linear contextual bandit problems (e.g. Abbasi-Yadkori et al. (2011 ), Chu et al. (2011 ). Unlike the greedy algorithm which we study, these algorithms explicitly explore. When the greedy algorithm gets a "warm start" (as is our case in the multiple parameter setting), it can be viewed as an instantiation of an explore-then-exploit algorithm, in which the "warm start" is viewed as the exploration phase. However, there are two important distinctions between our results and standard explore-then-exploit algorithms. First, explore-then-exploit algorithms are typically analyzed in settings in which the contexts are drawn i.i.d. from some distribution, and do not obtain diminishing regret guarantees in adversarial settings. In our setting, the contexts are selected by a (perturbed) adversary. Second, the number of examples with which we need to seed the greedy algorithm is much smaller than the number of exploration rounds that would be needed for a non-trivial regret guarantee in the standard setting: to obtain a regret guarantee that is diminishing in T , the exploration phase needs to scale polynomially with T . In contrast, the size of our "warm start" is independent of T .
Our style of analysis is inspired by the smoothed analysis framework, introduced by Spielman and Teng (2004) . "Smoothed analysis" studies the performance of an algorithm on instances that can be chosen by an adversary, but are then perturbed randomly, and represent an interpolation between worst-case and average-case analyses. Smoothed analysis was originally introduced to study the running time of algorithms, including the simplex algorithm (Spielman and Teng, 2004) , the Perceptron algorithm for linear programming (Blum and Dunagan, 2002) , and the k-means algorithm (Arthur et al., 2011) . In our case, we are not interested in running time (the algorithm we study always runs in polynomial time), but are instead interested in how the regret bound of the greedy algorithm behaves on smoothed instances. This is similar in spirit to how "smoothed analyses" are used to study other learning problems, as in Kalai et al. (2009) and Bhaskara et al. (2014) .
The general relationship between the exploration-exploitation tradeoff in bandit problems and fairness in machine learning has been studied by a number of recent works. Joseph et al. (2016a,b) and Liu et al. (2017) study how to design algorithms which satisfy particular definitions of fairness at every round of the learning process. Jabbari et al. (2017) extend this line of work to reinforcement learning settings. Kannan et al. (2017) explicitly consider myopic behavior as a friction to fairness in bandit settings, and studies economic interventions to alleviate it. Bird et al. (2016) consider in general the ways in which exploration can be problematic when the decisions involved concern human beings, and Ensign et al. (2017) study models of predictive policing, and demonstrate how a lack of exploration can lead to feedback loops which perpetuate unfairness. Bastani et al. (2017) was motivated in part by the moral imperative not to "explore" in life-or-death applications like clinical trials. Our work can be viewed as showing that (in linear settings) in the presence of small perturbations, the frictions to learning and fairness introduced by myopic decision making should not be expected to persist indefinitely.
Model and Preliminaries
We now introduce the notation and definitions we use for this work. For a vector x, x represents its Euclidean norm. We consider two variants of the k-arm linear contextual bandits problem. 
The second variant we consider has k distinct models governing the rewards for different arms:
Multiple Parameter Setting. 
We refer to an algorithm as no-regret if, with high probability over the randomness in the input,
. Throughout this paper we will fix a normalization so that β i ≤ 1.
Perturbed Adversaries
We consider a "smoothed analysis" setting that interpolates between an i.i.d. distributional assumption on the contexts, and a worst-case, completely adversarial input. Specifically, we think of contexts as generated by a two-stage process. First, an adaptive adversary picks the contexts arbitrarily from the unit ball. Then each context is perturbed independently by draws from a Gaussian with mean 0 and variance σ 2 . We refer to the overall process as a perturbed adversary, and formalize it next.
The history of an algorithm up until time T represents a transcript of the input-output behavior of the algorithm through time T , and is sufficient for reconstructing the internal state of the algorithm. In this paper we will concern ourselves with deterministic algorithms, and so will not complicate notation by referring to a transcript that encodes the internal randomness of the algorithm, but in general, a history would include any internal randomness of the algorithm used up until time step T as well: Formally, an adversary A (possibly randomly) maps from histories to k contexts: A : H * → R d k . In particular, this means that A can be adaptive. We denote the output of the adversary by (µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ k ) 4 . We assume that the adversary always outputs contexts with norms bounded by 1. Next we define the notion of a perturbed adversary, which encompasses both stages of the context-generation process.
Definition 2 (Perturbed Adversary). For any A, the σ-perturbed adversary A σ is defined by, in round t:
1. While the adversary always picks points within the unit ball, perturbations can push contexts outside the ball. We will sometimes truncate the perturbations so that the resulting contexts are contained in a ball that is not too big. Thinking of such truncated perturbations, we define a perturbed adversary to be R-bounded if with probability 1, x t i ≤ R for all i and t and all histories h t . We call perturbations (r, δ)-centrally bounded if, for each h t , arm i, and fixed unit vector w, we have w · e t i ≤ r with probability 1 − δ. We can interpret the output of a perturbed adversary as being a mild perturbation of the (unperturbed) adaptive adversary when the magnitude of the perturbations is smaller than the magnitude of the original context choices µ i themselves. Said another way, we can think of the perturbations as being mild when they do not substantially increase the norms of the contexts with probability at least 1 − δ. This will be the case throughout the run of the algorithm (via a union bound over
We refer to this case as the "low perturbation regime". Because we view this as the most interesting parameter regime, in the body of the paper, we restrict attention to this case. The "high perturbation regime" can also be analyzed, and we state results for the high perturbation regime in the appendix.
Proof Approach and Key Conditions
Our goal will be to show that the greedy algorithm achieves no regret against any perturbed adversary in both the single-parameter and multiple-parameter settings. The key idea is to show that the distribution on contexts generated by perturbed adversaries satisfy certain conditions which suffice to prove a regret bound. The conditions we work with are related to (but substantially weaker than) the conditions shown to be sufficient for a no regret guarantee by Bastani et al. (2017) . The first key condition, diversity of contexts, considers the positive semidefinite matrix E [xx ⊺ ] for a context x, and asks for a lower bound on its minimum eigenvalue. Intuitively, this corresponds to x's distribution having non-trivial variance in all directions, which is necessary for the least squares estimator to converge to the underlying parameter β: when we make observations of the subgaussian reward centered at β · x, we infer more information about β. 5 We only observe the rewards for contexts x conditioned on Greedy selecting them, implying that we see a biased or conditional distribution on x. To handle this, we have a different notion of diversity (a departure from Bastani et al. (2017) , who require a related condition on the unconditioned distribution).
A perturbed adversary satisfies (r, λ 0 )-diversity if for all h t and all i, the distribution D t i is (r, λ 0 )-diverse. Intuitively, diversity will suffice to imply no regret in the single parameter setting, because when an arm is pulled, the context-reward pair gives useful information about all components of the (single) parameter β. In the multiple parameter setting, diversity will suffice to guarantee that the learner's estimate of arm i's parameter vector converges to β i as a function of the number of times arm i is pulled; but it is not on its own enough to guarantee that arm i will be pulled sufficiently often (even in rounds for which it is the best alternative, when failing to pull it will cause our algorithm to suffer regret) 6 .
The second key condition, margins, will intuitively imply that conditioned on an arm being optimal on a given round, there is a non-trivial probability (over the randomness in the contexts) that Greedy perceives it to be optimal based on current estimates {β t i }, so long as the current estimates achieve at least some constant baseline accuracy. Combined with a small initial training set sufficient to guarantee that initial estimates achieve error bounded by a constant, this implies that Greedy will continue to explore arms with a frequency that is proportional to the number of rounds for which they are optimal; this implies by diversity that estimates of those arms' parameters will improve quickly (without promising anything about arms that are rarely optimal -and hence inconsequential for regret). Again, Bastani et al. (2017) require a related but stronger margin condition that does not condition on the arm in question being optimal.
Condition 2 (Conditional Margins). Let e ∼ D. We say D has (r, α, γ) margins if for all β 0 and b ≤ r β ,
A perturbed adversary satisfies (r, α, γ) margins if for all h t and i, the distribution D t i has (r, α, γ) margins.
The condition intuitively requires that on those rounds for which arm i has the largest expected reward, there is a non-negligible probability (γ) that its expected reward is largest by at least some margin (α β ). If Greedy's estimates {β t i } are accurate enough, this will imply that arm i is actually pulled by Greedy.
Complications: extreme perturbation realizations. When the realizations of the Gaussian perturbations have extremely large magnitude, the diversity and margin conditions will not hold 7 . This is potentially problematic, because the probabilistic conditioning in both conditions increases the likelihood that the perturbations will be large. This is the role of the parameter r in both conditions: to provide a reasonable upper bound on the threshold that a perturbation variable should not exceed. exceed. In the succeeding sections, we will use conditions we call "good" and "auspicious" to formalize the intuition that this is unlikely to happen often, so that for a constant fraction of rounds, the diversity and margin conditions will be satisfied (and that this is sufficient to prove a regret bound).
Single Parameter Setting
In the linear contextual bandits setting, we define the "Greedy Algorithm" as the algorithm which myopically pulls the "best" arm at each round according to the predictions of the classic least-squares estimator.
Let X t denote the (t − 1) × d design matrix at time t, in which each row t ′ is some observed context x
where arm i t ′ was selected at round t ′ < t. The corresponding vector of rewards is denoted y t = (r 1 i 1 , . . . , r t−1 i t−1 ). The transposes of a matrix Z and vector z are denoted Z ⊺ and z ⊺ . At each round t, Greedy first computes the least-squares estimator based on the historical contexts and rewards:β t ∈ arg min β ||X t β −y t || 2 2 , and then greedily selects the arm with the highest estimated reward: i t = arg max iβ t · x t i . The "Greedy Algorithm" in this setting is defined in Algorithm 1.
"Reasonable" rounds. As discussed at the end of Section 2, the diversity condition will only apply to an arm for perturbations e t i that are not too large; we formalize these "good" situations below. Fix a round t, the current Greedy hypothesisβ t , and any choices of the adversary µ The unconditioned diversity condition from Bastani et al. (2017) is enough to imply that each arm will be pulled sufficiently often, and hence yield a no regret guarantee -but unfortunately, that condition will not be satisfied by a perturbed adversary.
7 One can gain intuition from the one-dimensional case, where a lower truncated Gaussian becomes highly concentrated around the minimal value in its range. 8 We say a realization ofĉ
This is an event whose probability is determined by the perturbation added to the contexts of all arms except i, and it says intuitively that e t i does not need to be too large in order for arm i to be selected. Additionally, for a fixedβ t , µ t 1 , . . . , µ t k , we would like to argue that, if arm i was selected, then most likely (over the randomness in all the perturbations including i ),ĉ t i was r-good. We say that (
We will shorten this to saying a round t is "r-auspicious for i" with the implication that we are referring to Greedy's hypothesis and the adversarial choices at that round.
Regret framework for perturbed adversaries
We first observe an upper-bound on Greedy's regret as a function of the distance betweenβ t and the true model β. Let i * (t) = arg max i β ·x t i , the optimal arm at time t. For shorthand, denote its context by
. 
Given Lemma 3.1(whose proof is in Appendix B), it suffices to find conditions under whichβ t → β quickly. Intuitively, the input data must be "diverse" enough (captured formally by Definition 1) to infer β.
Lemma 3.2. Against a perturbed adversary satisfying (r, λ 0 ) diversity, for all i, t, we have
8 We ignore ties as they are measure-zero events.
Proof. We begin by manipulating the quantity we wish to lower bound. Define b =ĉ
where the first string of equalities follow from the definitions, the inequality follows from the superadditivity of the minimum eigenvalue, and the second-to-last equality follows from diversity.
Lemma 3.3 showsβ t approaches β at a rate governed by the minimum eigenvalue of the design matrix. Its proof is found in Appendix B.
Observe that the matrix
i . Lemma 3.2, diversity, and a concentration inequality for minimum eigenvalues (Tropp, 2012) , imply λ min Z t grows at a rate Ω(t) so long as must rounds are r − good. Thus, a bounded, diverse perturbed adversary with many auspicious rounds has estimators that converge quickly as a function of t.
Corollary 3.1. Let t min (δ/T ) = max 32 ln(4T /δ) ,
. Suppose the adversary is R-bounded and
rounds t are not r-auspicious for i t , then with probability 1 − δ, for all t ≥ t min (δ/T ),
Furthermore, we can show that centrally bounded adversaries are auspicious in nearly every round. Proof. Fix an arm i and let S i = {t : i t = i}, the set of rounds in which i is chosen by Greedy. Let A i be the set of rounds t that are r-auspicious for i. We wish to show |{t ∈ S i :
T and let B i be the set of rounds t on which, fixingβ t and {µ
: t B i }, so we will just need to upper-bound that size of the latter. To show this claim, fix some t and
We now complete the proof of the lemma by upper-bounding |{t ∈ S i : t B i }|. Its distribution is stochastically dominated by a Binomial(T , δ ′ ) (the case where every round has P i t = i < δ ′ by a tiny margin). So by a tail bound for Binomials (Corollary A.3), with probability at most
By a union-bound, this holds for all arms i except with probability at most δ.
We have everything we need to show that the greedy algorithm has low regret when facing a bounded, centrally bounded, diverse adversary: since its regret can be captured in terms of the distance of its OLS estimates to the true coefficients (Lemma 3.1), and its estimates converge quickly (Corollary 3.1) if it has mostly auspicious rounds (which it does, by Lemma 3.4). 
Proof. By Lemma 3.1 and R-boundedness, for any t * min ,
Let t 
So with probability at least 1 − δ, we get
Plugging in the definition of t * min as a maximum over three expressions, we obtain the stated bound. Remark 1. The three different bounds in Theorem 3.1 naturally correspond to three different regimes on the parameters in our problem. For each regime, we list the "intuitive" case for which it holds. In this paper we focus on the first case, i.e. for fixed s, k we focus on the asymptotics with respect to T , d, and small perturbations (as captured by λ 0 → 0). Remark 2. An upper bound on expected regret follows directly. First take the bound of Theorem 3.1 with δ := 1 T ; then, with the remaining probability δ, regret is upper-bounded by 2RT , so this contributes an additional additive expected regret of at most 2δRT = 2R.
The Gaussian, σ-perturbed adversary
We now apply the tools we developed in the previous section to show that Greedy has diminishing regret when facing a σ-perturbed adversary in the single-parameter setting, formally captured in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. In the single parameter setting against the σ-perturbed adversary A σ , with probability 1 − δ, for fixed s (rewards' subgaussian parameter) and k (number of arms) and
, Greedy has
The proof of this theorem, which will be formally presented at the end of this section, boils down to showing that the adversary is bounded with high probability (Lemma 3.5), then (conditioned on the adversary being bounded) showing the adversary is centrally bounded (Lemma 3.6) and diverse (Lemma 3.7), then applying Theorem 3.1.
The formal proof is slightly more complicated than just stated. Rather than performing this analysis with respect to the original Gaussian-perturbed adversary A σ , which is unbounded, the analysis is done with respect to a perturbed adversary A ′ σ where the perturbation is drawn from the truncated Gaussian distribution. We can view A σ as a mixture distribution of A ′ σ (with high probability) and some unbounded adversary A ′′ σ (with the remainder), where a hidden coin is flipped prior to running the algorithm which determines whether contexts will be chosen according to A ′ σ or A ′′ σ . A ′ σ and A ′′ σ are defined as follows, where A ′ σ has carefully-truncated Gaussian perturbations (truncations chosen for ease of analysis) while A ′′ σ may be unbounded. Recall that, given an adversary A, the Gaussian-perturbed adversary A σ is defined as
In other words, all coordinates of all (ε ′′ ) t i are drawn as joint Gaussians, but conditioned on the fact that at least one coordinate of at least one (ε ′′ ) t i has absolute value larger thanR. We observe that ε can be viewed as a mixture of (ε ′ ) t i , with the probability that all Gaussians have absolute value at mostR; and (ε ′′ ) t i , with the remaining probability. Now, givenβ t , let Q t be an orthonormal change-of-basis matrix such that Q tβt = ( β t , 0, . . . , 0). Then for each i = 1, . . . , k, we let
We have the following claim for this construction. (2): the fact that it is a mixture follows from the fact that ε is a mixture distribution of (ε ′ ) and (ε ′′ ). The probability of A ′′ σ in the mixture is the chance that there exists some i, t, j where (ε
) j in particular is symmetric and σ 2 -subgaussian, so
A union bound over the d coordinates, k arms, and T time steps gives the result. T )-centrally bounded for r ≥ σ 2 ln(T ). The next lemma states that the truncated Gaussian-perturbed adversary is diverse. The proof uses an orthonormal change of basis for the perturbations, which maintains the perturbation's Gaussian distribution but allows the form of the conditioning to be simplified. We then lower-bound the variance of the truncated Gaussian perturbations.
where ǫ t i is drawn from a special form of truncated Gaussian, the exact form of the truncation depending on previous time steps. In particular, fix a time step t, writeβ as shorthand forβ t and x as shorthand for the context selected by Greedy, with x = µ + e. Let Q be the orthonormal matrix such that Qβ = ( β , 0, . . . , 0).
Let b ≤ r β and take all probabilities conditioned on previous time steps andβ, µ t 1 , . . . , µ t k : Using the "variational characterization" of eigenvalues, the minimum eigenvalue is
where the last line uses that minimizing over w and over Qw yield the same result. Note that w·Qx = w·Qµ+w·Qe, so the variance is equal to d j=1 Var(w j (Qe) j ). Also, recall that by definition of A ′ σ , each (Qe) j is distributed independently as a Gaussian conditioned on |(Qe) j | ≤R. So, if we let ǫ ∼ N (0, σ 2 I d ), then we may write
Now, by Lemma A.9, we have forR ≥ 2r ′ that
We get a worst-case bound of Ω(σ 4 /r 2 ). (This uses that by construction r ≥ σ, so that this bound is smaller than Ω(σ 2 ).)
Because the Gaussian-perturbed truncated adversary is diverse and centrally bounded, our framework in the form of Theorem 3.2 implies the greedy algorithm facing the truncated perturbed adversary has diminishing regret. We find that our regret bound has two regimes, which correspond to "large" and "small" perturbations. In the large-perturbations regime, R = Ω(1), i.e. the perturbations e t i are generally larger than the underlying means µ t i . We find this less natural and well motivated than the small-perturbations regime, where perturbations are small relative to µ t i and we are interested in the growth in regret as σ → 0. But the regret bounds are reasonable for both regimes and in particular have aÕ( √ T ) dependence on the time horizon. 
Finally, we conclude that greedy has low regret with respect to the original (untruncated) perturbed adversary.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. As described above, we view A σ as a mixture distribution over two adversaries, one of which is A ′ σ . Let r = σ 2 ln(T ) andR = 2σ 2 ln(T kd/δ). By Lemma 3.5, the probability of A σ choosing the bounded adversary A ′ σ is at least 1 − δ 2 when choosingR ≥ σ 2 ln(2T kd/δ), which our choice ofR satisfies. Lemma 3.8 gives a regret bound, conditioned on facing A ′ σ , with probability 1 − δ 2 . By a union bound, these regret bounds hold for facing A σ with probability 1 − δ.
Remark 3. An expected regret bound can again be obtained directly from the high-probability bound by taking e.g δ = 1
T . There is a slight twist: The norms of the contexts are not bounded when facing A ′′ σ , which occurs with some small probability at most δ 2 . However, expected regret from this case is still bounded by 2T because, at each time step, the difference in expectation between any two choices i, i ′ is at most 2 (using spherical symmetry of A ′′ σ ).
Multiple Parameter Setting
In the multiple parameter setting, recall that each arm i ∈ [k] has an unknown true parameter β i and the goal is to have low regret compared to the algorithm that picks the largest β i x t i at each round t. Here, we cannot hope for the greedy algorithm to achieve vanishing regret without any initial information, as it can never learn about parameters of arms it does not pull (we formalize this with a lower bound in Section 5).However, we can show that in the presence of perturbations, it suffices to have a small amount of initial information in the form of n samples (x i , r i ) for each arm i.We refer to this as an n-sample "warm start" to Greedy. The full algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2. As discussed in Section 2.2, the key idea is as follows. Analogous to the single parameter setting, the diversity condition implies that additional datapoints we collect for an arm improve the accuracy of the estimateβ t i . Meanwhile, the margin condition implies that for sufficiently accurate estimates, when an arm is optimal (β i x t i is largest), the perturbations have a good chance of causing Greedy to pull that arm (β t i x t i is largest). Thus, the initial data sample kickstarts Greedy with reasonably accurate estimates, causing it to regularly pull optimal arms and accrue more data points, thus becoming more accurate.
Notation and preliminaries. Let t i (t) be the number of rounds arm i is pulled prior to round t, including the warm start. Let S i be the set of rounds t such that arm i is pulled by Greedy, and let S * i be the set of rounds in which arm i has the highest reward.
Recall that in the single parameter setting, the definitions of "good" and "auspicious" captured rounds where perturbations are not be too extreme. We introduce their multi-parameter analogues below.
Fix a round t, the current Greedy hypothesesβ . Again we shorten this to saying "round t is r-auspicious". We will also need corresponding definitions for capturing when arm i is actually the optimal arm. These are analogous, but replaceβ 
Regret framework for perturbed adversaries
Similarly to Lemma 3.1, the regret of Greedy shrinks as eachβ t i → β i . The proof is essentially identical, but in this case, we prove this for each arm i ∈ [k].
Lemma 4.1. In the multiple parameter setting, the regret of Greedy is bounded by
Diversity condition and convergence
We now show that with enough observations, the diversity condition implies that estimates converge to the true parameters. The only difference from the results in Section 3 is that now, these results will refer to particular arms' parametersβ t i → β i , and will depend on the number of observations t i (t) from those arms. For some analogous claims, the proofs are identical but for these notational changes, and are omitted. 
2 of the rounds t ′ ≤ t for which arm i was pulled are r-auspicious for i, then with probability at least 1 − δ,
.
It will be helpful to introduce some notation for a minimum number of samples (i.e. pulls of an arm) that suffice to apply concentration results and show that estimatesβ t i are "accurate", i.e. close to β i . Let
All parameters are generally clear from context and fixed constants dependent only on the instance, except for δ, which is a parameter the analyst may vary, so for shorthand we will write n min (δ).
Lemma 4.4. Consider an R-bounded, (r, λ 0 )-diverse perturbed adversary. Suppose, for each i, at most
rounds where Greedy pulls i are not r-auspicious for i. Then with probability at least 1 − δ, ∀i, t with t i (t) ≥ n min (δ),
Proof. Fix an arm i. For each t i (t), we apply Lemma 4.3 with δ(t) =
δ kt i (t) 2 6 π 2 . Note that j:t i (t)=j δ(t) ≤ δ k , so a union bound over time steps and arms give a δ probability of failure.
There are two steps to applying Lemma 4.3. First, we must satisfy the assumptions of the lemma by showing that for all t, t i (t) ≥ t min (δ(t)). Second, we apply the guarantee of the lemma by plugging in δ(t).
For the first, consider the two cases of t min (δ(t)) separately. If t min (δ(t)) = 32 ln(4/δ(t)), then it suffices to set t i (t) to at least 32 ln(4/δ(t)) = 32 ln 2kt i (t) 2 π 2 3δ
Let A = 64 and B = 3k δ , then by Lemma A.11, it suffices for t i (t) ≥ 2A ln(AB) = 128 ln 192k δ . For the other case of t min (δ(t)), we have
where we used that
and B = 2dk δ . Then for t i (t) to exceed (1), we require t i (t) ≥ A ln(Bt i (t)), which by Lemma A.11 holds for all t i (t) ≥ 2A ln(AB) (using that t i (t) ≥ 1, A ≥ 0, and B ≥ e). So it suffices for
In particular, we set the warm start size n equal to the right hand side, ensuring that the inequality holds for all i, t.
For the second step, we plug in δ(t) to Lemma 4.3:
In the last inequality, we used: Combining these implies for a large enough warm start, the estimates are within a small enough margin. we have
Each term in n * corresponds to a different requirement. The first ensures many r-auspicious rounds for each i; the next two allow Lemma 4.4 to conclude respectively each inequality in (2). These inequalities have the following purposes: the first to bound regret by summing over all rounds; and the second to apply the margin condition, by ensuring that all estimates are always sufficiently accurate.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. By Lemma 4.5, with probability 1 − δ 2 , each arm i has at most n * 2 rounds in which i t = i but the round is not r-auspicious for i (using that t i (t) exceeds the first case in the definition of n * ). We can therefore obtain the first case of (2) by applying Lemma 4.4, which uses that t i (t) exceeds the second case in the definition of n * : With probability 1 − δ 2 , for all i, for each t with t i (t) ≥ n * , β i −β t i is at most the first case of (2).
Finally, we argue that the second case of (2) holds if t i (t) exceeds the third case in the definition of n * . That is, we wish to show that 32 6Rds ln(4t i (t)dk/δ)
, D = 6Rds, and E = α min j β j /2. We wish to show
This is equivalent to t i (t) ln(Bt
If we let A =
, then by Lemma A.11, this is satisfied for all t i (t) ≥ n := 2A ln(AB). So, plugging back in, it suffices for t i (t) to exceed the third case in the definition of n * .
Margin condition and warm start
Here, we wish to capture the benefits of the margin condition, i.e. that arms which are often optimal are also actually pulled often by Greedy. Lemma 4.7 translates the margins condition more directly into our setting, saying that when arm i is optimal (and c t i is r-good), it is optimal by a significant margin (α β i ) with a significant probability (γ).
Lemma 4.7. Against a perturbed adversary satisfying (r, α, γ) margins, for all i, t we have
Proof. The margin condition, applied to β i , says that for any b ≤ r β i , Since this inequality holds for every r-good realization c, it holds when conditioning on the event that c t i is r-good.
Next, Lemma 4.8 shows that, if estimatesβ t i are accurate, this implies that arm i is actually pulled with significant probability when it is optimal.
Lemma 4.8. Suppose the perturbed adversary is R-bounded and has (r, α, γ) margins for some r ≤ R. Consider any round t where for all j we have
. Then conditioned on the event that arm i is optimal and c t i is r-good for i, arm i is pulled with probability at least γ independently of all other rounds. Proof. For convenience, let A = α min j ′ β j ′ . First, note that for all j,
By Lemma 4.7,
Note this conditions on the events that i is optimal and c t i is r-good. So we have by (3) thatβ This implies that arm i is pulled by Greedy.
Lemma 4.9 shows that if it has sufficiently accurate estimatesβ t i , Greedy will play i a number of times that can be related to the number of rounds for which i was optimal. Recall that S i , S * i is the set of rounds in which i t = i (Greedy pulls arm i) and i * (t) = i (arm i is optimal), respectively. 
for all i and t. Suppose that for all but C rounds t ∈ S * i , t is r-auspicious for i. Let S i (t), S * i (t) denote the rounds up to and including round t in which i is selected by Greedy and is optimal, respectively.
With probability at least 1 − δ, for all t ∈ S * i , if there exists some t ′ > t, t ′ ∈ S * i such that
δ rounds between being pulled by Greedy and being optimal.
Proof. Fix an arm i. In each round t where i is optimal and t is r-auspicious for i, c t i is r-good independently with probability at least 1 2 . So by Lemma 4.8, i is pulled with probability at least γ 2 independently. There may be up to C rounds in which i is optimal but not auspicious. Therefore, the chance of C + z rounds occurring where i is optimal without being pulled is at most (1 − We also need the fact that most rounds in which i is optimal are auspicious for i. Note this is identical to Lemma 4.5, except that it applies to auspicious rounds and optimal arms rather than auspicious rounds and Greedy's choice of arms. The proof is the same except with syntactic changes. When we combine Lemmas 4.7, 4.9, and 4.10, we get the key implication of the margin condition: With high probability, after an arm is optimal for a constant number of rounds, it is pulled by Greedy. . Then with probability 1 − δ, for each j ∈ S i ,
Proof. Combining Lemma 4.10 and Lemma 4.9, plugging in a failure probability of δ/2 to each lemma, we get that with probability 1 − δ (by a union bound),
General result
Theorem 4.1. Consider an R-bounded, (r, 1 T )-centrally, (r, λ 0 )-diverse perturbed adversary with (r, α, γ) margins. If the warm start size n ≥ n * (δ/2), where n * (δ/2) is defined in Lemma 4.6, then with probability 1 − δ,
Proof. If n ≥ n * (δ/2), then in particular for every t and i, the number of observations t i (t) of arm i up to round t is at least n * . Therefore, by Lemma 4.6, with probability 1 − δ 2 , we have for all i, t that
and furthermore
This implies, by Lemma 4.1, with probability 1 − δ 2 , for all j ∈ S i ,
So regret, by Lemma 4.1, is bounded by
where
This gives
We used that
Remark 4. Once again, one can derive bounds on expected regret from these high-probability guarantees. However, it is worth noting that, by setting δ = 1 T to achieve an expected-regret bound, one introduces a log(T ) factor into the size of the warm start n * . Some such dependence on T is necessary for sublinear expected regret, as can be shown with a variant of our lower bound technique. However, this result is still quite positive for settings with perturbations: With only a log(T ) amount of "exploration", Greedy obtains sublinear expected regret even with adversarial inputs. This may be compared to non-perturbed settings where polynomial amounts of exploration are needed even when inputs are i.i.d.
σ-Perturbed adversary
In this section, we consider Gaussian perturbations and show the following: Greedy has, with probability at least 1 − δ,
To show this result, we need to show that the perturbed adversary A σ satisfies the margin condition, and furthermore, that that bounded perturbed adversary A ′ σ does. We formally define A ′ σ and A ′′ σ in Appendix C, with a construction exactly analogous to the single parameter setting, and show the following: Proof. We want to show that for e ∼ N (0, σ 2 I), for all b ≤ r β ,
βe is distributed according to N (0, β 2 σ 2 ), so if we let η = βe β , then η ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). For some r ′ ≤ r,
By Lemma A.10, this is decreasing in r ′ and so is minimized for r ′ = r. We use the Gaussian tail bounds (Lemma A.6)
Using α ≤ r (which follows from r ≥ σ and α = 
To prove D ′ has (r, α, γ/4) margins, consider any b ≤ r β and any β. We have
Now, by assumption and using that b ≤ r, we have the chain of inequalities
So (5), which is decreasing as θ increases, yields
because D has (r, α, γ) margins. 
Proof. First, we claim that TV(D, D ′ ) = P e∼D max j |e j | >R . This follows because if D, D ′ both have welldefined densities, and S * is the (measurable) set of outcomes where D ′ places a lower density, then TV(D,
In our case, D ′ places probability 0 on any e with max j |e j | >R, and for any other e, D places a higher probability density than D (as its density is equal to that of D, but up-weighted by a conditioning). So
where Φ is the standard Gaussian CDF. 
Therefore, it remains to prove that
By Gaussian tail bounds (Lemma A.6),
where φ is the standard Gaussian PDF. So (note that Φ(−z) = 1 − Φ(z))
And
using that r + α ≥ 2σ to lower-bound 1 − . So ifR ≥r + σ 2 ln(8d), then we have
This proves Inequality 6. In Appendix C, we prove the main result of this section, Theorem 4.2, as a case of Theorem C.1 (which considers both large and small perturbations). The proof combines the bounds on the margin condition from Corollary 4.2 along with the diversity condition bound of Lemma C.3.
Lower Bounds for the Multi-Parameter Setting
In this section, we show that Greedy can be forced to suffer linear regret in the multi-parameter setting unless it is given a "warm start" that scales polynomially with 1 σ , the perturbation parameter, and 1/ min i ||β|| i , the norm of the smallest parameter vector. This shows that the polynomial dependencies on these parameters in our upper bound cannot be removed. Both of our lower bounds are in the fully stochastic setting -i.e. they do not require that we make use of an adaptive adversary. First, we focus on the perturbation parameter σ. . Informally, we show that the estimators after the warm start have additive error Ω 1 √ n with a constant probability, and when this is true, with constant probability, arm 1 will only be pulledÕ n 2/3 rounds. Thus, with constant probability greedy will pull arm 2 nearly every round, even though arm 1 will be better in a constant fraction of rounds. Let us use the notationβ i to refer to the OLS estimator immediately after the warm start, and recall that β t i refers to the OLS estimator after round t along with the warm start samples.
We now define several events which are useful for describing the initialization and evolution of the OLS estimators. Fix some constants c 1 , c 2 . Define the event C 1 to be when the initial estimator for arm 1 from the warm start is small:β
and event C 2 to be when the initial estimator for arm 2 from the warm start is large:
and the event C which corresponds to C 1 and C 2 both occurring.
Similarly, let L t 1 be the event in which arm 1's estimator in round t is significantly below its mean:
and event L t 2 the event in which arm 2's estimator in round t is not significantly below its mean:
and L t the event in in which both L t 1 , L t 2 occur in round t. Let the event G be the event in which all t rounds have bounded contexts, namely that for all i, t:
We will first show that after a warm start of length n, event C occurs with constant probability: the initial OLS estimates are off by some multiple of their standard deviation (Lemma 5.1). If this is the case, then the estimation error will often cause greedy to select arm 2 during rounds in which arm 1 actually provides higher reward. In many of these rounds, greedy incurs regret Ω 1/ √ n . For our lower bound to hold, it suffices to show that the greedy algorithm makes such mistakes on at least a constant fraction of T rounds. We condition on the contexts being bounded (event G) and event C for the remainder of the informal description. If L t continues to hold (1's estimator stays small and 2's large, respectively), then on a constant fraction of rounds the greedy algorithm will pick arm 2 even though arm 1 has reward that is higher by 1 √ n . So, we aim to bound the number of rounds for which L t does not hold (equivalently the number of rounds in which L t 1 is false, plus the number of of rounds for which L t 2 is false but L t 1 is true). We argue that with constant probability, L t 1 is true for all rounds and L t 2 is false for at most O(n 2/3 ln n 2/3 ) rounds. While L t 1 has been true for all previous rounds, the only way to choose arm 1 is for L t 2 to be false; pulling arm 2 and having a small resulting estimate happens at most O(n 2/3 ) times (Lemma 5.2) with a constant probability. Once arm 2's estimate is small and arm 1's is small, we argue that with probability 1 − δ, after O( ln 1 δ ) rounds, arm 2 will be pulled again (and therefore either L t 2 will be true again or this pull of 2 will count as one of the O(n 2/3 ) pulls of 2 which can cause it to be small). So, while arm 1's estimate is small, arm 1 won't be pulled very many times, and if arm 1 isn't pulled very many times, there is constant probability it will never get large enough to be played more often.
We now formalize our lemmas before proving the main theorem. The first lemma states that the warm start of size n has constant probability of producing OLS estimators with error on the order of 
The next lemma formalizes the idea that, conditioned on an initially too-large OLS estimate, there are relatively few rounds for which that OLS estimator is updated to be much below its expectation. 
Then,
The next lemma states that the contexts have magnitude that can be uniformly bounded with constant probability, and that the OLS estimators are somewhat smooth: if they are computed from ≥ n samples, to move them by an additive 1 √ n , one must have n new observations. . Refer to this event as G.
Furthermore, if after the estimatorβ
Proof of Lemma 5.3. The first claim follows by a direct application of concentration of a σ-sub-Gaussian random variable: with probability 1 − δ, one is at most σ ln 1 δ from its mean, e.g. that for any fixed t
and a union bound and algebra imply that for all t, we have
√ n where this follows from an lower bound on δ of at most 1 100 and the upper bound on σ. We now proceed to prove the second claim conditioned on G. For simplicity, define x j i = 0 for any round j for which we do not have an observation of arm i.
Then, we can upper-bound how much our estimator moves:
where the last inequality (which holds with probability 1 − δ) follows from a Hoeffding bound for subGaussian random variables and noticing that j η j i is Gaussian and µ t i = µ i for all i.
We now proceed with the proof of the main theorem. 
We show that with constant probability, the regret of greedy is Ω T − n 2/3 1 √ n . This implies greedy's overall regret is also Ω T − n 2/3 1 √ n : for any event E, we have that
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 5.1 and the last inequality follows from the definition of the instance: the reward of arm 1 is larger than that of arm 2 with probability at least 1 2 since its average reward is higher and the perturbations are iid and symmetric.
We note that, conditioned on G, if bothβ
So, if arm 1 is to be pulled conditioned on G, eitherβ
We use this fact below:
We now instantiate E to be the event thatβ
for all but 0.0048n 2/3 rounds after it was pulled in round t and that for all of these times, at most ln
δ pairs of contexts arrive before one for which x t 2 > x t 1 , causing arm 2 to be pulled anew. This conditioning affords us the following:
where the final bound follows from Lemma 5.2. We now upper-bound the probability arm 1's estimate gets large:
arm 1 pulled at most n times before round t
arm 1 pulled more than n times before round t
where we used the concentration result forβ t 1 ,β 1 of Lemma 5.3 and the conditioning on C, a small initialization ofβ 1 , and finally the conditioning on E implying that arm 1 will have been pulled at most 0.0048n 2/3 ln n 2/3 δ times with probability 1 − δ, which will mean its estimate stays small when these events occur.
We now collect terms from Equations 11, 12, 13, which together imply:
Regret(greedy)
where the last equality follows from the fact that C and G are independent (one has to do with the warm start, the other with the contexts arriving after the warm start), and the last inequality uses Lemmas 5.2 and a union bound on the probability any one of the 0.0048n 2/3 runs of arm 2 being small without being pulled lasting longer than ln n 2/3 δ being at most δ , Lemmas 5.1 and 5.3.
We now turn our attention to showing that the warm start must also grow with 1/ min i ||β i ||. Informally, the instance we use to show this lower bound has unperturbed contexts µ t i = 1 for both arms and all rounds, and β 1 = 8ǫ, β 2 = 10ǫ. We show again that the warm start of size n yields, with constant probability, estimators with error
, causing Greedy to choose arm 2 rather than arm 1 for a large number of rounds. When 2 is not pulled too many times, with constant probability its estimate remains small and continues to be passed over in favor of arm 1. Finally, we calculate the expected regret coming from these e 1 18σ 2 rounds of pulling arm 2 rather than arm 1. β 2 x t 2 − β 1 x t 1 = 2ǫ 4x t 2 − 5x t 1 = Ω(ǫ) with any constant probability. So, with constant probability, the expected regret is at least (x 1 , η 1 ) , . . . , (x t ′ −1 , η t ′ −1 ) subject to x t ′ ≤ r. Then with probability at least 1 − δ,
Then because each η t ′ is mean-zero and s-subgaussian, for any fixed x t ′ with x t ′ ≤ r, the variable η t ′ x t ′ is mean-zero and rs-subgaussian and independent conditioned on steps 1, . . . , t ′ −1. Therefore, each coordinate of S t is an rs-subgaussian martingale. By a Hoeffding inequality, Lemma A.2, we get that with probability 1 − δ/td, that coordinate is at most 2trs ln(td/δ). Union-bounding over all coordinates and summing their squares, we get with probability 1 − δ, S t 2 ≤ 2drts ln(td/δ). 
Proof. We have for any choice of θ > 0 
Corollary A.1. In the setting of Lemma A.3, if µ ≥ 10R 2 ln(2d/δ) and P λ min (W t 
Proof. By Lemma A.3 with α = 1 2 ,
plugging in µ ≥ 10R 2 ln(2d/δ). Now, we have
Lemma A.4 (Laurent and Massart (2000)). Suppose X ∼ χ 
A.2 The Gaussian and truncated Gaussian distributions
A truncated variable is one conditioned on falling into a certain range. The inequality is justified as follows: The integral (when weighted by the 1 σ 2 √ 2π factor) computes the total probability of a N (bσ 2 , σ 2 ) variable falling into a range of length 2R, and this is maximized by the range [−bσ 2 , bσ 2 ]. The final equality is justified by the definition of p, since the integral (again weighted by the factor) is the probability of a Gaussian with variance σ 2 falling withinR of its mean.
The following, Lemma A.6 is relatively standard derivation of tail bounds for the Gaussian distribution, although we do not know of a reference containing this particular bound. We make the following notational definitions for the lemma: For integers n, N ≥ 0, let (where an empty product equals one) In particular,
Proof. We first show that . Lemma A.6 implies that (using x ≥ 2 for the second inequality)
It follows that the variance, which can be rewritten as 1 + α − h 2 , only decreases by plugging in the middle term as a lower bound on h. So maximum eigenvalue of x ⊺ x, and a lower bound on the minimum eigenvalue of its expectation. The upper
